Learning and Work hybrid seminars, spring/summer 2026

When: Tuesday, 7th of July 2026
Time: 12.00 - 13.00
Where: TS53 - C-1.05

Speaker: Amelie Schiprowski (Uni Bonn)

Titel: Reducing Mandatory Applications in Unemployment Insurance

Abstract: This paper estimates the effects of a large-scale reduction in job applications by unemployment benefit recipients. We exploit a policy experiment in the Swiss Unemployment Insurance, where a subset of Public Employment Services significantly reduced the number of required applications and the use of vacancy referrals. Based on detailed administrative data and difference-in-differences designs, we find that the policy change led to an increase of about 6% in the average duration of unemployment spells. Exploiting additional variation in caseworkers’ pre-reform usage of vacancy referrals, we find that the reduction in application quantity (search requirement) and the increase in selectivity (vacancy referrals) each account for approximately half of the overall effect. The estimates suggest an elasticity of job finding to applications of approximately 0.13. Finally, the policy change led to an average 2% increase in reemployment earnings, primarily driven by the reduced use of vacancy referrals. The findings suggest that policies restricting individuals’ job search selectivity involve significant trade-offs between unemployment duration and reemployment earnings.