Learning and Work hybride seminars, herfst/winter 2026

Wanneer: dinsdag 8 september 2026
Tijd: 12.00u - 13.00u 
Waar: TS53 - C-1.03

Spreker: Marc Witte (VU)

Titel: Wage Information and Applicant Selection

Abstract: How much a job pays is a key factor in job seekers' search decisions, but most job adverts do not list salaries. To study the reasons for and consequences of this behavior, we conduct a field experiment in which we randomly vary whether real job adverts include salary information and observe resulting applications. We find that wage posting does not affect the average number of applicants but amplifies wage-based sorting: relatively high-wage postings attract more applicants, while low-wage postings attract fewer. Applicant quality, however, remains unchanged. We contrast these results with predictions from leading models of directed search and identify several puzzles: we find no sorting of workers on quality despite the differences in expected payoffs between vacancies; at the same time, firms continue to avoid posting wages despite the absence of adverse selection effects. We propose a new explanation for firms’ behavior: bargaining offers an insurance mechanism against significant search and information frictions. Our results highlight how endogenous information frictions may arise and affect the sorting and matching processes central to talent allocation in labor markets.

Geplande seminars:

22-09-2026 Harald Pfeifer - BIBB, ROA - GEANNULEERD
06-10-2026 Anna Bindler - DIW Berlin
20-10-2026 Mengwei - UB
03-11-2026 Guillem Foucault - TSE
17-11-2026 n.t.b.
01-12-2026 Albrecht Glitz - Barcelona
15-12-2026 Sandra McNally - University of Surrey

Voorgaande seminars:

25-08-2026  Bohdana Kurylo, ROA - Subject-Specific Rank and the Educational Tracking of Migrant Students